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Primitive accumulation, the social common,
and the contractual lockdown of recording
artists at the threshold of digitalization
Matt Stahl

abstract

This article examines the apparent paradox of the persistence of long-term employment contracts for
cultural industry ‘talent’ in the context of broader trends toward short-term, flexible employment. While
aspirants are numberless, bankable talent is in short supply. Long-term talent contracts appear to embody
a durable, perhaps inherent, axiom in employment: labour shortage favours employees. The article
approaches this axiom through the lens of recent reconsiderations of the concept of ‘primitive
accumulation’. In the case of employment, this concept highlights employers’ impetus to transcend legal
and customary barriers to and limits on their capacity to capture and compel labour. The article supports
this argument through the analysis of contests between Los Angeles-based recording artists and record
companies over the California and federal laws that govern their political-economic relationships. These
struggles reveal a pattern of attempts by record companies to overcome or change laws that limit their
power in the employment relation. The article suggests that as contractual norms change under
digitalization, familiar political dynamics continue to characterize the relationships between recording
artists and the companies that depend on their labor.

[W]hen a statesman looks coolly on, with his arms across, or takes it into his head, that it is not his
business to interpose, the prices of the dexterous workman will rise.’ (James Steuart, 1767, quoted
in Perelman, 2000: 155)

Introduction
Binding, long-term employment contracts for creative labour (or ‘talent’, in industry
jargon) are important to the recording industry and have featured in legislative and
courtroom battles between recording artists and record companies for decades. Today,
points of contractual friction are shifting as artists and companies explore new
contracting conventions in response to challenges stemming from digitalization and the
unauthorized distribution of music via the Internet. Where record companies and
recording artists often argued before lawmakers and judges over the allowable duration
of their contracts, they are increasingly concerned with negotiating the contract’s
coverage of formerly off-limits recording artist activities such as touring and
merchandising. Drawing mainly on legislative and judicial documents and trade journal
reportage, this article examines ongoing changes in contracting conventions. It traces
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late 20th century contests over laws that governed recording contracts, and considers the
‘360 deal’, one of the main contractual innovations emerging in response to the recent
destabilisation of the recording industry. The article links the political-economic logics
of contracting under the old and emergent regimes through the lens of ‘primitive
accumulation’, a Marxian concept that highlights capitalists’ ongoing drive to overcome
legal and/or traditional limits to the extension of the capital relation (De Angelis, 2004,
2001; Bonefeld, 2001; Midnight Notes Collective, 1990; Perelman, 2000). It argues that
even in the contemporary context of labour’s increasing casualisation, the impetus of
cultural capitalists toward contractual capture and control of valuable talent exemplifies
the usefulness of the ‘primitive accumulation’ perspective in the analysis of work and
employment.
Option contracts, rules, and the ‘360 deal’
Unsure of new artists’ potential value, record companies typically require new artists to
sign open-ended ‘option’ contracts. Option contracts give companies the exclusive right
periodically to renew or end the employment; if an artist under contract becomes (or
shows promise to become) profitable, the company will typically exercise its option(s)
to continue the relationship, if not, they can ‘drop’ the artist. Option contracts
essentially guarantee employer control of the artist’s creative labour and products on an
exclusive and assignable basis for as long as the employer chooses to exercise it; artists
under such contracts face severe penalties for breach. The benefit to employers of this
kind of control is a substantial legal claim on the forms of income that can be generated
from the marketing of the artist’s work and likeness which, conversely, obligates the
company to very little. Moreover, most new artists sign their first contracts from
positions of bargaining weakness, as relative unknowns. While artists may be able to
renegotiate for better terms as they become more successful, these contracts prevent
them from offering their talents to other bidders on an open market, thus keeping their
costs to their initial employer artificially low.1
Despite the option contract’s general auspiciousness for employers, companies making
use of it sometimes encounter obstacles or limits to the full exploitation of the
contract’s advantages. Among the impediments to the maximisation of the option
contract are labour and bankruptcy law, which preserve some rights for artists in their
status as employees by setting limits on what can be included in the contract. Employers
of valuable talent have long chafed against the legal obstacles and limits posed by these
forms of law; their legislative activities evince a pattern of attempts to change law in
order to reduce or remove these impediments.
As a result largely of digitalization and file-sharing, however, recording artist
contracting is taking place in a business environment that is extremely different from
the one in which these longstanding conventions developed. In particular, record sales
have begun to lose their pride of economic place as the ‘hole in the universe’ rent by
__________
1

The logic of the long-term option contract is so favourable to entertainment-industrial stability, in
fact, that some contemporary Hollywood observers are suggesting the film industry ought to revisit
some of the legal labour practices of the system that were tossed out along with the system’s many
illegal aspects (Moore, 2009).
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file-sharing threatens record industry revenues (Pareles, 2010: AR1).2 One way around
this problem has been the development of the ‘360 (degree) deal’, so named because it
enables the company to ‘participate’ in virtually all artist activities and revenue streams,
including such formerly off-limits areas as merchandise and touring (Leyshon et al.,
2005). With the 360 deal comes a shift of attention and emphasis from the
public/legislative to the private/contractual arena. The RIAA’s member companies are
developing a new contractual form in which terms that are governed by law (such as
duration) concede priority to terms that spell out the number and kinds of activities that
the contract covers. However, not all has changed: a ‘primitive accumulation’ analysis
highlights crucial continuities between the fading and emerging regimes. Under the 360
deal, this analysis suggests, ‘unconscionable’ conditions of indentured or even
involuntary servitude that some analysts find codified in the recording contract
(Anorga, 2002; Gardner, 2006; Brereton, 2009), ‘in which the victim is forced to
work…by use or threat of coercion through law or legal process’ (United States v.
Kozminski, 1988), appear to become more rather than less of an issue in the record
industry.

Primitive accumulation
In both the royalty-driven, individual unit sales era and the internet-destabilised, stillworking-on-a-stable-business-model era, record companies use recording contracts to
secure control over certain of the recording artists’ activities. They do this by requiring
that artists (voluntarily) make themselves contractually vulnerable – legally unable to
say ‘no’ without penalty – to certain kinds of demands.3 Many of the earlier era’s
demands had to do with how long a successful artist could be held to a relatively narrow
contract; many such demands were limited by forms of law that endowed employees
with some countervailing powers and rights. Today’s demands increasingly concern the
breadth of the range of artist activities in which a company may ‘participate’ (by
claiming some portion of revenue related to given activities and/or some rights of
decision-making power over them); legal limits have become less important in
determining which activities can be contracted for.4 In both cases the dynamic at issue
is the extension of employer power, whether across greater lengths of time or over a
wider range of activities. In each case, this analysis argues, extension requires the
transcendence of former (legal or customary) limitations or obstacles to increased
employer power, of which the obvious corollary is increased employee vulnerability.
Employer efforts to increase employer power and worker vulnerability are not new; the
efforts of record companies under both regimes have an illuminating analogue in a
phenomenon first called ‘primitive accumulation’ by Marx’ translators, and recently
elaborated in Marxist political theory and economic history. For Marx, capital is not a
__________
2
3
4

File sharing is far from the only culprit in the music industry’s crisis of profitability (Leyshon et al.,
2005; Peitz and Waelbroeck, 2004).
The question of substantive vs. formal voluntariness is beyond the scope of this paper. For an
illuminating treatment see Macpherson (1973).
Of course, recording contracts could not legally require artists to do anything illegal; such a contract
would be invalid.
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thing (e.g., Adam Smith’s ‘stock’) but a relation: the separation of people from direct
access to the means of subsistence and production. This separation renders some people
– those who have not already accumulated or inherited wealth – dependent on markets
in which they must sell their labour and, with their money wages, purchase what they
need to survive. Primitive accumulation has conventionally been understood to describe
a historical period when nascent or proto capitalists advanced the preconditions for
capitalist development through the enclosure of common lands. Enclosures curtailed
people’s rights and access, for example, to land on which they could grow food for
themselves, increasing the pressure on them to buy rather than grow what they needed,
and to undertake paid work to earn the necessary wages.
Recent reinterpretations of Marx’ writing, however, suggests the concept plays a much
more central and ongoing role in economic life. Massimo De Angelis argues for a
broadening of primitive accumulation to include all efforts by capital – personified by
its owners and their agents – to transcend various limits and barriers to the extension of
capital’s relation of separation. As a political-theoretical category, De Angelis writes,
primitive accumulation ‘define[s] a strategic terrain among social forces’ not locked in
the past (2001: 68). The logic of primitive accumulation is starkly visible, for example,
in present-day efforts to privatise public utilities such as water and water services.
Public utilities prioritise people’s rights and access to necessary means of life,
demarcating areas of life protected from (excessive) commodification; their
privatisation represents capital’s transcendence of prior limits on the penetration of
markets into hitherto protected (non- or less-marketised) areas of life.
A ‘social common’
The privatisation of water is an easily legible example because it so clearly rehearses
the spectacular enclosures of the early period at the same time as it exemplifies the
continuous nature of primitive accumulation in the modern world. Axiomatically
speaking, in a fully marketised society (an impossibility in all but the most extreme
contractarian fulminations), you have no right to anything you have not purchased. The
maximal proliferation of markets in drinking water depends on the elimination of nonmarket or traditional or human rights to water. Without a right to clean water, thirsty
people are at the mercy of those who hold title. Alongside plainly visible enclosable
commons like clean water is a less legible but equally important ‘social common’ which
‘sets a limit to the extension, the scale’ of the capital relation in everyday life (De
Angelis, 2001: 18). According to De Angelis, ‘socio-economic rights and entitlements’
are bulwarks (often resulting from ‘past battles’) that protect people’s standard of life,
as do rights to water their ability to live. ‘State institutions’, he writes, ‘have developed
and attempted to accommodate many of these rights and entitlements with the priorities
of a capitalist system. The entitlements and rights guaranteed by the post-war welfare
state for example, can be understood as the institutionalisation in particular forms of
social commons’ (De Angelis, 2001: 19).5 ‘A classic example’, De Angelis writes, ‘is
__________
5

De Angelis notes that this dynamic is captured in Polanyi’s account of the social-protective ‘double
movement’:
[O]n one side, there is the historical movement of the market, a movement that has no inherent
limits and that therefore threatens society’s very existence. On the other, there is society’s
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the body of rights, provisions and entitlements universally guaranteed by the welfare
state in spheres such as health, unemployment benefits, education, and pensions” (2004:
80). These serve as limits to the extension of the capital relation, or marketisation,
because they underwrite people’s capacity to say “no” to degrees of domination and
exploitation considered excessive by the social movements and policymakers
responsible for them.
The rights and entitlements embedded in the forms of labour- and debtor-protective
legislation attacked by the RIAA in the cases I recount below are not identical with
those rights to resources and public wealth named by De Angelis above. I nominate
them, however, as an intermediary form that ought to be considered as part of the social
common because they share with those rights the practical function of limiting the
power of employers to compel people in and to work. The barriers to market influence
created by the “rights and entitlements” De Angelis names are not impermeable; these
rights and entitlements can be more or less influenced by markets and yet still have
incrementally egalitarian effects. In the U.S., for example, the quality of ‘public’
primary and secondary education your children can expect is determined to an
enormous degree by the property taxes collected in your neighbourhood; market values
of homes thus play a role in determining how much public money is directed to schools
in different neighbourhoods (Barry, 2005: 67-68). No progressive would deny,
however, that full marketisation of education would pose a disastrous advance from this
partial market influence. However imperfectly, publicly-funded education mitigates the
influence of markets on the distribution and quality of education. Similarly, labourprotective legislation attenuates the power of markets to set the terms of employment,
without creating totally non-market social spaces.
The rules of contract duration, minimum compensation, and bankruptcy protection
attacked by the RIAA help(ed) protect working people from being held under contract
by a single employer, guaranteeing them the limited but real right periodically to take
advantage of competition between employers for their services or to leave the
employment altogether. These rules put limits on employers’ market power without
rendering affected working people invulnerable to market power. In each case, where
the record company-recording artist relationship met certain conditions, the rule could
intervene and open an exit for the artist, even when the artist had voluntarily agreed to
unfavorable terms. In each case, the RIAA sought to place obstacles in front of these
exits, in order to make it easier to keep valuable artists under contract for as long as
could be desirable. All three of these efforts are better understood in the context of the
significant autonomy enjoyed by successful, late 20th century recording artists.

__________
propensity to defend itself, and therefore to create institutions for its own protection. In Polanyi’s
terms, the continuous element of Marx’s primitive accumulation could be identified as those social
processes or sets of strategies aimed at dismantling those institutions that protect society from the
market. (De Angelis, 2004: 69)
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Recording artist autonomy
Part of the reason why record companies work so hard to establish control over the
labour and output of recording artists is the unusually high degree of autonomy
typically enjoyed by many recording artists. The extraordinary position of recording
artists relative to other forms of talent in film, television, publishing and other popular
media has at least two medium-specific explanations.6 First, and most significantly for
the present discussion, recording artists’ unusual autonomy is rooted in their
historically-developed ability to derive significant incomes from activities not covered
by their recording contracts. This pattern emerged in an exemplary form among mid20th century U.S. swing bands. As Jason Toynbee writes, these touring ensembles, like
the rock’n’roll and rock groups that followed them, ‘were able to sell their services
directly to several buyers’ – of live as well as recording studio performances – “and so
avoid dependence on any single one” (Toynbee, 2003: 44). This self-sufficiency has
shaped the terms of record deals for many popular music performers. It has become
institutionalised and can limit record companies’ capacity to control the labour of their
artists. (As I show below, this theme appears in record companies’ arguments for laws
that would increase their leverage in contractual relationships with performers.) Second,
the market value of a popular musician can rest to an unusual degree in the public’s
perception of the artist as autonomous. This principle has long been understood to
operate primarily in jazz, folk, blues, and rock cultures, where evidence of an act’s
authenticity is important to fans’ monetizable investments (Frith, 1981; Keightley,
2001), although recent scholarship has shown that this principle is also important in
other genre cultures (Leach, 2001; Stahl, 2002; Tregoning, 2004).
The combination of these factors positions many recording artists at what might be
called a frontier of employee control and autonomy in market society. Recording
contracts are contracts for employment, but these artist-workers’ autonomy seems to
call that status into question, making them appear more like independent contractors.
Employment presumes dependence, but recording artists are already quite independent.
Employment law limits employees’ vulnerability to employer fiat; the unusual
independence of recording artists is (or rather was – see section 4, below) further
consolidated, supported and protected by such law. The recording artist’s significant
degrees of independence often (but not always) translate into significant degrees of
autonomy in their contractual employment,7 and are often perceived by their employing
record company firms as a threat to the stability and profitability of their business. If the
profitability of the recording industry depends in large part on the power of record
companies to capture, elicit, and control the ‘recording services’ (and resulting
‘phonorecords’) named in recording contracts, then recording artists’ capacity to avoid,
thwart, or mitigate record companies’ power of capture and control constitutes the
__________
6
7

Recording artists’ asserted ownership of copyright in their sound recordings may constitute an
additional explanation of their autonomy. See Nimmer and Menell, 2001; Stahl, 2008.
The case of George Michael (Panayiotou v. Sony Music Entertainment (UK) Ltd., 1994) illustrates
the nonidentity of independence and autonomy. When blockbuster artist Michael began to change
musical directions, Sony, he charged, refused to promote a new album reflecting his emerging
(autonomous) musical vision, believing that fans would not accept it. Michael lost a subsequent suit
to be released from his contract (Soocher, 1999: 43-63).
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degree to which (companies fear) artists can hold companies at ransom over various
contractual issues’.
In the latter decades of the 20th century, in response to real and perceived threats to their
power to capture and control recording artist labour, the major record companies (to
whom many of the most successful artists were under contract) sought to set limits on
the autonomy of their artists. Through the RIAA, the major record companies pursued,
resisted, and sometimes obtained significant changes to law that could or would alter
the bargaining ‘playing field’. Artists, with less success, have struggled against and also
pursued legislation. The lion’s share of these changes has benefited record companies
by expanding their power to command recording artists’ labour.

Legislative contests
1979-87: The ‘Olivia Newton-John problem’ and California’s ‘seven year’ rule
The late 20th century era of record label-recording artist legislative battles was initiated
by the RIAA following the resolution of a 1979 court contest between the singer Olivia
Newton-John and her record label, MCA Records. The singer had given notice of her
intention to stop recording under their 1975 contract, and MCA, who had been reaping
significant profits from the deal, sought to induce her to keep recording for them (or at
least inhibit her from competing with them) by preventing her from recording for any
other record company. Superficially, the decision in the case favoured MCA: the
appellate court approved and enforced an injunction to prevent the artist working for
any other record label for the two-year remainder of the term of her contract with MCA.
However, when the dust settled it was clear that the interests of Olivia Newton-John
(and of recording artists as a group) had been better served by the decision than those of
MCA (and of the other major record labels). This discovery led to the RIAA’s
successful effort to change California labour law to its advantage.
At both the lower and appellate levels, the Olivia Newton-John case involved the
interpretation of a century-old California law that limited the duration of employment
contracts to seven years: both courts held that no injunction could extend past that law’s
seven year limit. This finding alerted artists to an interesting fact: the only penalty to
which an artist in breach of contract could be subject was a period of recording studio
idleness that would end on the seventh anniversary of the artist’s contract. For artists
who could earn income by touring or appearing in films, for example, such idleness
might not pose a compelling hardship. Moreover, this interpretation seemed to promise
an immediate way out for artists under contracts that had already exceeded seven
years.8 ‘The effect of the Newton-John decision upon the recording industry’, Robert
Steinberg noted already in 1981, ‘has been tremendous’ (1981: 104). It demonstrated to
the industry that a contract with a fixed duration weakens the employer’s bargaining

__________
8

See Melissa Manchester v. Arista Records (1981).
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position, and spurred executives, attorneys and lobbyists to create a way around this
newly discovered hazard.9
In response, the RIAA set out to eliminate ‘seven year rule’ protection for recording
artists. In 1985, acting explicitly on the association’s behalf, California state senator
Ralph Dills (D-Montebello) introduced a bill to achieve that end. The bill foundered in
various forms until, two years on, Dills finally introduced a version that appeared less
coercive than earlier versions. Rather than extending the duration limit for all California
workers for an additional number of years, this version specified that a person hired to
produce ‘phonorecords’ could still leave the employment at the old seven year mark,
but only if she had produced all the albums that could contractually have been required
under the contract. If the departing artist had not fulfilled all possible album options set
out in the contract she would be vulnerable for damages on ‘lost profits’ on those
uncompleted albums. Thus, while the power of injunction expired at the seventh
anniversary, the new law created a right for the company to demand damages of
sufficient magnitude to keep the artist under contract. This version passed in 1987.
The arguments over the various versions of the bill are fascinating and I treat them in
detail elsewhere (Stahl, 2010, forthcoming). Here, I want only to highlight some of the
main themes in the RIAA’s 1985 arguments for the change. ‘[C]urrent law in
California’, the association claimed, ‘has been used as a weapon by prominent, highly
successful recording artists.’ By invoking the seven year rule, recording artists could
‘force their record company employer/financiers into renegotiating contracts under
circumstances in which the record company is not even sure it will get the benefit of the
new bargain.’ If the record companies did not submit, they argued, ‘the alternative to
renegotiation is that the artist will sit out the balance of his contract term with
impunity.’ The RIAA argued that the artist’s bargaining power, moreover, is unfairly
enhanced ‘because he can and does earn substantial sums from ‘live’ entertainment
tours and personal concert appearances’, reducing the artist’s dependence on the
recording agreement for income. These ‘inequities’, they argued, would be corrected by
Dills’ bill (Gang et al., 1985: 4). The bill passed, the ‘Olivia Newton-John problem’
(Passman, 2006: 101) was solved, and through their vulnerability to damages for
records that could contractually be required (whether or not the options are ever
exercised by the company), recording artists may be kept under contract for indefinite
periods.
1992-3: Minimum compensation and negative injunctions
The seven year rule provides the employer with the remedy of an injunction against the
employee within the seven year limit. The 1987 damages provisions, opponents to the
carve-out argued, effectively extend the injunctive power beyond that limit.10 However,
__________
9

Following the 1979 Newton-John case were those Donna Summer (1980), Melissa Manchester
(1981), Sammy Hagar (1981), and Tom Scholz of Boston (1984) all sought relief with varying
degrees of success. See McLane and Wong (1999).
10 Artist attorney Jay Cooper argued before a March, 19, 2002 hearing of the California State Senate
Committee on the Judiciary that artist lawsuits ‘cost millions of dollars today, and very few artists in
this world can afford those things, and they have to settle, they eventually have to cave, because…the
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in order to be able successfully to petition a California court for an injunction against a
non-performing employee, the employer must pass a simple test. The employer must
have guaranteed and paid compensation at or above a minimum dollar amount set by a
1919 law. If they have not done this, they cannot obtain an injunction, no matter the
behavior of the artist. In 1992, recording artist advocates sought to update that figure to
an amount reflecting seven decades’ worth of inflation. Their efforts, though partially
successful, actually ended up weakening a central aspect of the law’s public policy.
Injunctions against employees were prohibited in California until 1919, when the
Legislature sought to grant employers more power to induce employee performance and
found a precedent in the 19th century case of a concert promoter stymied by a
recalcitrant singing star (Lumley v. Wagner, 1852). However, in recognition of the
extreme nature of injunction’s power of compulsion, the Legislature set a strict
condition on their issuance: the worker had to have been guaranteed and paid no less
than $6000 per year under the contract (California Civil Code, Section 3423). At the
time, that sum – about five times the average annual wage for a working American –
was thought to demonstrate both the extraordinary value of the performer to the
employer and the good faith of the employer, thereby establishing the case for the
injunction. The value of this sum has evaporated through inflation; the law has since
been interpreted as an assignment of a ‘counterweight’ to the employer’s ability to
(otherwise costlessly) restrain a performer from performing for any other employer
(Lucas, 1985: 1073). In the 1960s, 70s and 80s, a handful of cases (including MCA v.
Newton-John) interpreted the law. In cases involving the comedian Redd Foxx (1966)
and the singer Teena Marie (1984), the performers were released from their contracts
because their record companies had neither guaranteed nor paid the statutory (and
paltry) minimum of $6000.
In 1992 California State Senator Henry Mello put forward a bill that would update the
minimum compensation law in line with 70 years of inflation. Mello’s bill replaced the
$6000 figure with $50,00011 and passed in both houses without a single ‘no’ vote.
Almost immediately an alarmed RIAA contacted the legislature, arguing that the new
minimum would have a ‘severe’, potentially ‘destructive’ effect on the industry (Lopez,
1993). Mello then convened a working group that came up with new legislation that
was passed in 1993. The new legislation raised the 1919 figure to $9000 in the first year
of the contract, $12,000 in the second, progressing to $45,000 in the seventh year. The
reduction in the revised 1993 bill of 1992’s $50,000 minimum – particularly
pronounced in the first years of a contract – was very well received by smaller firms.
‘This is the greatest thing for a small record company’, an independent music executive
told Billboard, ‘because it protects us against being outbid’, as can happen once a small
record company’s artists become successful and attractive to bigger firms (Fitzpatrick,
1993: 23).
__________
threat of a lawsuit is almost the same as an injunction’ (audio recording on file at the California State
Archive, Sacramento).
11 While five times the average annual wage of a working American in 1992 was $100,000, the
rationale of the BHBA was that 1919’s $6000 were worth $47,000 in 1992, and that $50,000 would
sufficiently increase the ‘counterweight’ against the power to enjoin an employee to restore the teeth
to the 1919 law.
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However, the new law contravened a public policy rationale expressed by the courts in
the earlier cases. The law’s original rationale is protective, it denies employers access to
an injunction unless the employee has been well paid up to the moment of
disagreement. In the 1960s record companies began inserting a new kind of option
clause in their contracts which gave them the option to make (or make up) the minimum
payment in response to an artist’s announcement of his or her intention to stop
performing under the contract. The Teena Marie court’s opinion oozes with disdain for
this practice and finds that it violates the law. If this new form of option is found to be
legal, that court wrote,
the company may wait until the last possible moment to exercise its option. Motown and Jobete
filed suit against Teena Marie in August 1982 but waited until September 1982 to exercise the
option clauses. The request for a preliminary injunction was filed two months later. Thus, the
companies purchased an insurance policy worth a considerable sum [Motown’s profits on Teena
Marie’s recordings were quite high] for a minimal premium just prior to the time they could be
fairly certain a loss would occur. If the option clause [could be found to] meet[] the statutory
requirement of minimum compensation, [then] the company can buy its insurance policy on the
courthouse steps on its way to seek an injunction. (Motown Record Corporation v. Tina Marie
Brockert, 1984)

‘Indeed’, the court continued, ‘the company may be able to buy its insurance policy
after the “accident” has occurred; that is, after the artist has already signed and recorded
with another company’ (Motown Record Corporation v. Tina Marie Brockert, 1984).
The 1993 law, however, allows precisely this ‘courthouse steps’ insurance policy. As
Billboard reported,
the new bill allows a company to retain an artist even if the company does not meet the minimum
compensation rate – as long as it agrees to pay 10 times the difference of the original
compensation. For example, if an artist is paid only $ 7,000 on a one-year contract, which is $
2,000 below the minimum, the company may keep the artist by paying $ 20,000. (Fitzpatrick,
1993: 23)

The company, in other words, may buy the right to enjoin the artist, if the artist attracts
attention from another company, even if they’ve paid the artist nothing up until that
time. The very strategy scorned and invalidated by the Teena Marie court as
contravening the law’s founding logic became fundamental to the operation of the law,
which underwrites the (albeit more expensive) ‘courthouse steps’ insurance policy.
Guaranteed and paid minimum compensation is no a longer necessary precondition for
an injunction, as long as the original company is willing to cough up a larger amount of
money to obtain the injunction and thereby prevent the artist from accepting other bids.
1998: Bankruptcy and the rejection of contracts
In the mid- to late 1990s, a handful of recording artists – notably including AfricanAmerican performers Run-DMC (1993), TLC (1995), and Toni Braxton (1998) –
sought bankruptcy protection. The latter’s filing was particularly big news because at
the time her hit song ‘Unbreak My Heart’ ‘was still generating countless radio royalties’
(De Lisle, 2000: 72). One feature of a successful bankruptcy petition is the release of
the petitioner from obligations known as ‘executory contracts’, that is, contracts that
require the performance (‘execution’) of some specified action in the future. Debt is one
such contract but there are many others, including the recording contract (Brewer, 2003:
346
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588). Shortly after Braxton’s bankruptcy filing, the RIAA attempted to change pending
federal legislation (then being pushed by credit card companies) in order to make it
more difficult for recording artists to declare bankruptcy and void their recording
contracts. This effort was rebuffed, and the 1998 legislation failed. However, the
recording industry’s position – along with those of the consumer credit industries – was
strengthened when sweeping bankruptcy reform legislation was passed several years
later.
The important place of bankruptcy provisions in US law was first recognised in Article
1, Section 8 of the U.S. Constitution; despite this recognition, it was not until 1898 that
bankruptcy law became a permanent feature of US law (Landry and Mardis, 2006: 94).
The first major reform of the law took place in 1978, which, according to Robert
Landry and Nancy Mardis ‘did not alter the fundamental policy [that had long been] in
favor of debtors’ (2006: 94). For most of its history US bankruptcy law placed a
significant burden on creditors to demonstrate that individuals seeking bankruptcy
protection were doing so ‘for reasons other than financial distress’ (Pritchard, 1998: 8).
The same burden to show ‘bad faith’ and/or ‘substantive abuse’ applied to record
companies trying to enforce their contracts by contesting artist bankruptcy claims. Only
a very small percentage of recording artists turn to bankruptcy; trying to escape a
contract through the declaration of bankruptcy ‘is risky’, write MacLane and Wong,
‘because there is no guarantee that the bankruptcy court will reject the contract in
question’ (1999: 27). In the wake of the successful bankruptcy gambles of Braxton,
TLC, and Run-DMC, the credit card companies’ legislative push offered the RIAA an
opportunity to put obstacles in the way of artist bankruptcy.
In May of 1998, just a few months after Braxton’s January bankruptcy filing, the RIAA
pushed Representative Bill McCollum, a Republican from Florida’s entertainment
industry-dominated city of Orlando, to insert a provision into the pending bankruptcy
reform legislation that would demand a higher standard of court scrutiny for recording
artist filings than for those of any other kind of person.12 A favorable Chapter 7
bankruptcy judgment empowers a court-appointed trustee to ‘reject’ executory contracts
if it appears that doing so will facilitate a person’s economic rehabilitation (Brewer,
2003: 589). In asking McCollum and other representatives to support the provision, the
RIAA argued that artists were increasingly using the bankruptcy code’s Chapter 7
language to escape from their recording contracts. ‘Unscrupulous lawyers’, acting on
behalf of recording artists, argued RIAA president and CEO Hilary Rosen, ‘are
extorting record labels into rewriting existing record contracts – ones they freely
entered for their clients – by threatening bankruptcy’ (Stern, 1998: 6).
The RIAA advanced legislation that would alter the ‘playing field’ in their favour. They
induced McCollum to insert their proposed language into the pending bankruptcy
reform legislation after the bill had been discussed, ‘without benefit of debate at the
subcommittee and committee level’ (Holland, 1998). Union officials discovered the new
__________
12 Justin Pritchard noted that ‘[s]ince 1995, McCollum has received $3,000 from the RIAA political
action committee, campaign records show. House Judiciary Committee members overall received
$8,700 from the RIAA’s PAC during the 1997-98 election cycle, including $1,000 contributed to
McCollum’ (1998: 8).
347

ephemera 10(3/4): 337-356
articles

Primitive accumulation, the social common…
Stahl

language prior to its coming up for a vote. When made public, the legislation led to an
outcry from artists and their professional and legislative allies. The RIAA (and, in this
case, the sponsoring lawmaker) then contended the legislation was technical rather than
substantive. The association insisted ‘that the legislation is not seeking a “special
interest” exemption as its opponents are claiming, but instead is trying to close a
loophole in current law’ (Seelye, 1998: A18). The RIAA provided no evidence that any
of the recent bankruptcies had been pursued in bad faith, and little that any more than
the handful of cases mentioned above had actually been threatened or taken place. In
declining to document the scope of the problem, an RIAA lobbyist said ‘I simply can
tell you based on personal conversations that there’s a problem that should be
addressed’ (Pritchard, 1998: 8). McCollum acknowledged ‘I don’t recall the number
precisely, but it strikes me that there’s three or four cases they cited to me’ (Pritchard,
1998: 8). Thus, while observers acknowledged the likelihood that recording artists’
bankruptcies were driven by artists’ desires for substantive re-negotiations, they also
looked sceptically on the RIAA’s unwillingness or inability to substantiate its own
claims.
Finally, concerned senators sent the RIAA to recording artist representatives to hammer
out a compromise and ‘craft substitute language that does not specifically mention
recording artists’ (Holland, 1998: 12). The two groups agreed on language suggesting
somewhat toothlessly that bankruptcy judges may consider ‘whether an individual
debtor seeks to reject a personal services contract and the financial need for such
rejection as sought by the debtor’ (Holland, 1998: 12).
The bankruptcy reform legislation that ultimately passed (the Bankruptcy Abuse
Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005) made it more difficult for most
Americans to pursue bankruptcy protection, though it contained no language pertaining
solely to recording artists. By introducing means-testing and by shifting more of the
burden of proof away from creditors and onto individuals seeking bankruptcy
protection, the new legislation made it much more difficult for bankruptcy courts to
excuse individuals from their financial obligations (Landry and Mardis, 2006).

Atavism at the threshold of digitalization?
Primitive accumulation and protective legislation
California’s seven year rule and its requirement of minimum compensation as a
precondition of injunction, and federal bankruptcy law’s low pre-2005 threshold for
voiding executory contracts, established and enforced limits on record companies’
power over recording artists’ labour. In order for record companies to maintain and
advance their stability and profitability during turbulent times, the RIAA argued,
recording artists had to be constrained in their capacity to invoke these legal limitations
of employer power. I have suggested that the efforts of this group of employers to
extend their control over their artists bears an obverse, corollary dimension: the
ratcheting up of employer control requires and produces increased employee
vulnerability. This is the salience of the primitive accumulation analysis: when capital
encounters an obstacle or a limit it often works aggressively to overcome it; the limit’s
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transcendence often requires and results in the erosion of the employee’s political
position.
The record industry’s continued dependence on the long-term option contract might
seem to contradict the 21st century’s prevailing logics of digitalization and employment
casualisation. In digitalization’s brave new world of ‘convergent media’ and ‘liquid
life’ (Deuze, 2007) contractual labour subordination seems as obsolete as the mortal
coils of magnetic tape and vinyl grooves recently shuffled off by the record industry. It
is tempting to understand record companies’ legal paroxysms over capture and control,
after Ernst Bloch and Frederic Jameson, as an ironic example of the ‘simultaneity of the
non-simultaneous’, the ‘the coexistence of realities from radically different moments of
history[, of] peasant fields with the Krupp factories or the Ford plant in the distance’
(Jameson, 1991: 307 (drawing on Ernst Bloch)). Yet the rigid enforcement powers on
which companies still depend for their control of labour are not only not inimical to
corporate flexibility, they are central to it. ‘Casual’ is an attribute of the job and not the
worker. As Guy Standing writes, prison labour is ‘the most casual form of all, in that
the worker has no rights, cannot bargain, and can be made to do as much labour as
somebody sees fit’ (2010: 71). The option contract is a one-way arrangement of
obligation: employees are locked in, employers are free to exit at any time.13 Employer
efforts at extending the capacity to capture, elicit, and control creative labour through
primitive accumulation are consistent with casualisation in that they push past prior
public policy or traditional limits on marketisation, on capital’s freedom and expansion.
When successful, such efforts diminish impediments that might otherwise constrain
employer fiat.
When the RIAA pushes state and federal legislators to tilt the record industry ‘playing
field’ in their favour, they are engaging the state in a project of primitive accumulation
through the latter’s power to impose what Marx called ‘[d]irect extra-economic force’
(De Angelis, 2004: 67). The argument here is not about contrasting abstract or idealised
states of ‘freedom’ and ‘unfreedom’ but about showing, with Michael Perelman, how
employers and politicians incrementally adjust the rights of working people in different
ways, at different times, in response to different constellations of forces and priorities.
The constraining of recording artists’ liberty by the restriction of their access to a
market for their labour (case A), and by making it more difficult for them to pursue
bankruptcy relief (case C), began ‘with the identification [by capital] of a concrete limit
and the deployment of strategies for its transcendence’ (De Angelis, 2004: 72). Such
‘strategies also target any given balance of power among classes that constitutes…a
resistance against the further process of capitalist accumulation’ (De Angelis, 2004: 70).
The legalisation of the ‘courthouse steps’ option to justify an injunction in the absence
of actual minimum compensation (case B) was a response to the resistant assertion of a
new limit, in the form of a required $50,000 annual payment to artists to justify
injunction.
__________
13 This standard industry deal framework is discussed in exhaustive detail in a number of recording
industry reference works, including Passman (2006). Passman, a respected entertainment industry
attorney, writes ‘DON’T BE FOOLED! OPTIONS ARE NEVER GOOD FOR YOU!! They only
mean you’ll get dropped if you’re not worth the price, or you’ll get too little if you’re a smash. So
repeat after me: “OPTIONS ARE NEVER GOOD FOR ME!!!”’(2006: 99, emphasis original).
349

ephemera 10(3/4): 337-356
articles

Primitive accumulation, the social common…
Stahl

The 360 deal and the extension of the scope of the contract
A ‘hole in the universe’ cannot simply be plugged. As the record industry scrambles to
reproduce itself around file-sharing, how are these relations changing? Music industry
players and observers have proposed numerous models and strategies following the
disruption of the CD-sales-based business model. Among the main innovations along
these lines is the 360 deal. ‘360’ describes a situation in which the artist is contractually
surrounded by corporate toll gates through which pass most or all artist revenues – not
just record royalties – now subject to record company ‘participation’. In fact, in many
such agreements, companies not only gain significant percentages of formerly
inaccessible streams of revenue, but also decision-making power over those activities.14
‘By expanding the scope of their relationships with artists’, notes Sara Karubian, ‘labels
are shifting their focus from trying to reverse the trend of declining CD sales to
compensating for the decreased sales by participating in more profitable arenas’ (2009:
422). This language of an expanded scope immediately suggests the identification by
record industry capital ‘of a concrete limit and the deployment of strategies for its
transcendence’ (De Angelis, 2004: 72). However, with the 360 deal, it is strategies of
class power more than state power that are involved, reshaping the content rather than
the legal conditions of the long-term talent option contract. The main target of this force
is the longstanding barrier between artists’ record royalty income (customarily claimed
by the record company) and artists’ traditionally independence-sustaining revenues
from live performance, licensing of music (including to television and film producers,
video game companies, advertisers), and merchandise (from tour t-shirts to deals with
retailers like Hot Topic).
There are numerous practical advantages to both record companies and artists to
engaging on these terms: not only are record companies – increasingly recreating
themselves as what Edgar Bronfman Jr. calls ‘music based content companies’ (quoted
in Schultz, 2009: 700) or what James McQuivey calls ‘music talent managers’ (quoted
in Basch, 2008: E1) – invested in music marketing in a range of new and profitable
venues, able to replace revenue lost to declining sales and reposition themselves better
to take advantage of unforeseen licensing or marketing opportunities. New recording
artists themselves may enjoy lowered pressure to produce hits and thus more time to
develop their act and fan base, as well as a larger relative royalty percentage (Leeds,
2007); established artists can trade some relatively calculable profit for ‘a measure of
financial certainty’ (Pearlstein, 2008: D1) as they shift some risk onto a big company
like concert promoter Live Nation.
Observers disagree regarding the degree to which 360 deals might be becoming the new
normal.15 In any case, according to Karubian, it appears clear that ‘the bargaining power
dynamic remains relatively consistent in the shift from traditional to 360 deals’ (2009:
__________
14 As is the case with Nickelback’s deal with Live Nation (Gallo, 2008: 1).
15 Some observers suggest the form is ‘used by all the major record labels’ (Leeds, 2007), that ‘it’s
everywhere’ (producer Josh Abraham, quoted in Leeds, 2007). One record company president said
that he didn’t ‘think there’s a deal being made today where the 360 model doesn’t come up’
(Morrissey, 2007). Others suggest that ‘those types of contract are still far from the norm’ (Sisario,
2009: C1).
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442). In fact, her analysis indicates incremental gains in employer leverage as ‘labels
have used their publicised crisis to their advantage in negotiating terms with artists’,
appearing ‘justified in their claims that they need to dip into non-recording revenues
when they insist that their full reliance on the recorded music business will lead them to
extinction’ (2009: 443). Against this, Karubian notes that ‘many artists and their
advocates worry that companies are invading and planting their flags in territories
traditionally belonging to artists’ (2009: 443). Again, Karubian’s language points to the
usefulness of a primitive accumulation analysis for understanding struggles over the
boundaries to maximal marketisation of terrains of employment set by labour and
finance law.
Michael Perelman’s account of the ‘secret history of primitive accumulation’
illuminates the strategic regulation by early liberal political economists and
policymakers of ‘self provisioning’, the capacity of people to meet their own
subsistence needs outside of, or without dependence on, the employment relationship
(Perelman, 2000). Alongside the enclosures of common lands, 18th and 19th century
policy makers and their political economist allies learned carefully to manage a mix of
self-provisioning and wage labour in order to minimise the cost of labour. ‘They
wanted’, Perelman writes, ‘to make sure that workers would be able to be self-sufficient
enough to raise the rate of surplus value’ – self-provisioning as a wage subsidy –
‘without making them so independent that they would or could resist wage labor’
(2000: 107).16 The continuous form of primitive accumulation through the regulation of
self-provisioning was ‘a matter of degree. … capital would manipulate the extent to
which workers relied on self-provisioning’, and hence the degree to which they
depended on employers, ‘in order to maximize its advantage’ (2000: 32).
As Toynbee (quoted above) argues, popular music performers’ ability to sell their
services to a number of buyers enabled them to avoid dependence on any single one.17
Although the recording contract is an employment contract, and state law treats
recording artists as employees, their relative independence along these lines renders
them more like independent contractors, market participants with little or no capital
who ‘are able to protect themselves, to some extent, from work-related risks…because
they self-insure themselves, to some extent, by spreading their risks’ among a number
of clients (Davidov, 2002: 394). Michael Perelman argues that ‘the struggle against
self-provisioning is not confined to the distant past. It continues to this day’ (2000: 11).
I’m suggesting that popular music performers’ incomes from live appearances,
licensing and merchandising functioned as a form of self-provisioning (within the
market, yes, but not subject to record company claims), relieving recording artists from
total dependence on record companies. This is precisely what the RIAA was

__________
16 An exemplary target for this kind of policy was the English kitchen garden, the size of which was
carefully regulated in the early 19th century. Perelman quotes Robert Gourlay, who in1822 declared
that ‘[i]t is not the intention to make labourers professional gardeners or farmers! It is intended to
confine them to bare convenience’ (2000: 108).
17 At the same time, of course, artists’ non-recording income subsidizes record companies. See
producer Steve Albini’s grim (1997) calculations.
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complaining about in its 1985 arguments for the (1987) legislative carve out of
recording artists from protection by California’s seven year rule (quoted above).18
This principle is at the heart of recent legal analyses of the 360 deal. According to Ian
Brereton, in addition to their income participation,
[t]he major labels’ retention of final-decision making rights on all recording, touring,
merchandising, and publishing activities forces artists, and ultimately their creative endeavors, to
be subject to the complete control of their record label.

Casting this new relationship as a partnership, he writes, would be false; ‘under this
new type of agreement, the complete sacrifice of control to one party violates an
important principle of partnership law’, which requires mutual rights of control (2009:
195-196). Before the advent of the 360 deal, argues Tracy Gardner, an artist attempting
to avoid involuntary servitude (‘in which the victim is forced to work…by use or threat
of coercion through law or legal process’) by breaching her contract would be faced
only with the loss of recording revenues. Under the new deal, where companies
participate administratively and economically in non-recording activities like touring,
licensing, merchandising, and so on, the artist ‘is faced with a lack of alternate revenue
streams upon which artists before her could rely’ (Gardner, 2006: 755). 360 deals ‘only
add to the unconscionability of the artists’ situation because artists have lost control
over the ability to convert their musical fame into other financial opportunities’
(Gardner, 2006: 750). The 360 deal represents capital’s identification as a limit of what
before had been simply a conventional separation between spheres of economic activity
under its control and those under the control of the artist.
Despite radical challenges to the industry’s business model, the major labels offer
opportunities for which (aspiring) recording artists compete vigorously; pressure on
aspirants to sign anything in order to enter what Steve Greenfield and Guy Osborn call
the record deal’s ‘holy of holies’ (1998: 177) means that if the 360 deal is what’s on
offer, few without significant bargaining power or attractive alternatives will be able to
resist it. Abandoned by increasing numbers of file-sharing (non-) consumers, record
company capital pushes in another direction, transcending former barriers, colonizing
new regions of musical economic activity, and consolidating new dimensions of
political control, particularly over legions of new artists in weak bargaining positions.

Conclusion
Throughout the 80s and 90s the RIAA engaged in a series of public, political contests
with recording artists over several of the elements of state and federal legislation that
set the terms of their contractual engagement. The two sides experienced differing
degrees of success and failure in these contests, but the largely or apparently stable
nature of the ‘playing field’ itself assured the incremental nature of most of the resulting
changes. In the early 2000s, in the face of digitalization and file-sharing’s apparently
tectonic destabilisation of the record industry, the emerging ‘360 degree deal’ promised
__________
18 This argument was also made in MCA’s complaint against Newton-John.
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a way in which record companies and recording artists could continue to profit in the
face of declining sales through the record companies’ investment and participation in
formerly off-limits forms of economic activity such as touring, licensing, and
merchandising. ‘Given their command of the entire recorded music industry’, writes
Tracy Gardner,
it is hardly surprising that the record labels are quickly gaining control over new revenue streams
as well as traditional revenue channels that once belonged solely to the artist (2006: 751).

Yet, while this ‘new deal’ is still nascent, it appears to herald intensified relations of
control and appropriation between record companies and recording artists.
This article has argued that both incremental changes in legislated authority relations
and in private contractual conventions can be understood through the theoretical lens of
primitive accumulation, a mode of political and class power exercised by capital to
overcome limits to its expansion. Recording artists can be understood as an illuminating
case of continuity and change in the social relations of cultural production under
conditions of digitalization and the widespread unauthorised distribution of cultural
commodities enabled by internet technologies. Seen from the primitive accumulation
perspective, the persistence of binding, long-term option contracts is not anomalous in
the context of digitizing, flexibilizing, 21st century terrains of employment. Rather,
these new contracts are admirably suited to the maintenance of low-obligation cultural
industry ‘options’ where the principal difference is found in the types of boundaries,
limits, and obstacles encountered by record company capital in its pursuit of greater
freedom favourably to arrange its artist employment relations. In this light, the impetus
of cultural industry enterprise toward the intensification of long term capture and
control of ‘golden-egg’ laying talent appears not to subside but to change form and
venue.
When applied to the work of recording artists, categories like ‘involuntary servitude’
and ‘primitive accumulation’ sound strange. Their use in this context depends on a
degree of abstraction that itself requires the putting aside of popular images and
narratives of expressive individuals enjoying un-alienated lives and sometimes great
fame and wealth. But it is precisely recording artists’ extraordinary autonomy that
constitutes certain aspects of their value, that makes their legal protections the targets of
repeated employer attacks, and that makes their struggles so dramatic, so capable of
bringing obscure logics into high relief. This examination of some of the legal dynamics
of their unusually autonomous careers, of the laws that enable and constrain their
capacity to say ‘no’ to the various historically-conditioned demands of their employers,
argues that problems of autonomy and control have been and remain central to the
relationships of recording artists and their record companies. Laws and conventions that
preserve and protect this capacity pose impediments to the ability of record companies
to extend their advantage, provoking reactions that, until recently, often took place in
public, before legislators, and that now appear increasingly to be taking place in private
negotiations over new contractual territories.
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